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Abstract 
Ten years have now passed since New Zealand began the liberalisation and restructuring of its economy. Basically we 
have gone from a country where a young person could leave school at fifteen and get a low-skilled job in the freezing 
works of the electrical assembly industry, to one where few such jobs now exist and there is nearly 10% unemployment. 
It is now clear that the manufacturing sector has been responsible for about 75% of the net job loss. This paper takes 
an overview of the research and data now available to document the specifics of the change in manufacturing 
employment ,focusing on the causes, policies, and the results of the changes, and describes the character of the 'lean, 
mean' sector which has emerged after the ten years of change. 
It is fair to say that of all the sectors of the New Zealand 
economy, manufacturing has been most affected by the 
restructuring and deregulation policies since 1984. The 
fall in manufacturing jobs (over 80,000 1980-1990) ex-
plains over 75% of the net increase in unemployment 
Gone are the days when in New Zealand a young person 
could leave school at 15 and get a reasonable job in the 
dairy factory, freezing works or the Ford Motor Company. 
These jobs still exist, but they are dramatically fewer in 
number and there has been an upgrading in the 'skill level' 
required. 
In 1982 I visited a small factory making a towist-market 
product in a small New Zealand rural town. They then 
employed 15 worlcers, only three in sales management, 
distribution or marketing. Today they still employ about 
12 workers in production, but the process is far more 
mechanised, they produce three times the output and their 
total labour force has doubled, all the increase being in 
sales, management, distributing and marketing. Now this 
increase in employment is actually unusual for New Zea-
land, but this case illustrates the dramatic increase in 
productivity and the change in the skills and orientation of 
employment 
The industrial landscapes of our largest cities lie strewn 
with the deserted monoliths of a by-gone industrial era. In 
Wellington for example one can view in relatively close 
proximity in Petone, the former Gear meatworks, the New 
ZealandMotorCorporationassemblyplant,theFordMotor 
Company assembly plant, and General Motors: the list 
could go on to include many smaller firms that have closed 
or shifted. This period of unprecedented decline in the 
manufacturing work force (labelled variously as restruc-
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tming, de-industrialisation, or simply industrial change) 
stands out against three decades of growth in the industrial 
worlc force. 
Table 1 shows for example that in the 1950s manufacturing 
employment increased over 37,100 (23.1 %); in the 1960s 
it was over 75,000 (a massive 37.9%); by the 1970s it 
increased another 45,000 (16.9%); but in the 1980s it 
declined by over 82,000 (-25.9%). 
The obvious question arises: what has produced this cata-
clysmic change in a relatively short space of time? To 
answer this question we must examine the historical devel-
opment of New Zealand manufacturing, and the changing 
political economy within which it has developed. 
New Zealand manufacturing: inefficient, 
underdeveloped, and overprotected? 
A combination of three factors seemed to ensure the early 
direction for New Zealand manufacturing. Firstly the 
isolation from major sources of imports in the 19th century 
meant that we were forced to develop a wide range of 
industries given our size and population, at a time when the 
sailing ship voyage from England to New Zealand took on 
average 110 days. Secondly the small dispersed nature of 
the cash-strapped colonial economy meant that rampant 
laissez-faire capitalism never really flourished, and the 
government always had to pick up the tab for major 
investments and regulations. Thirdly the prevailing politi-
cal culture favoured this anyway. The govenunent came to 
be looked upon as friend and provider. In this political and 
cultural soil the welfare state flourished at a uniquely early 
stage, and it was but a short step to full blown Keynesian 
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Table 1. Historical change in New Zealand manufacturing: full-time equivalents employed 
1950-1990 ('OOOs) 
1950 1%0 
FOO<L Bev ., Tob. 36.3 45.6 
Textiles and clothing. 37.1 39.5 
Wood and W .Prod. 21.1 20.7 
Paper and Prod. 11.6 18.5 
Chem. and Petrol. 9.0 13.4 
Non M. Minerals 7.1 8.8 
Base Metals 1.7 2.1 
Fabricated Metal P. 33.2 45.5 
Other Manufacturing. 3.4 3.6 
Total 160.7 23.1% ( +37 .1) 37.9% 
Manufacturing. 197.8 
Total Labour Force 720.6 861.1 
Source: Philpott (1990) 
economic policies of intervention, regulation, and protec-
tion. 
Natural isolation meant that the tariff was the main weapon 
used for industrial protection. This was until the fall in 
freight costs along with the effects of the Great Depression 
meant that New Zealand's manufacturing sector was seen 
to be vulnerable. Import licensing was therefore intro-
duced in 1938, ostensibly to limit imports for balance of 
payments reasons. But this more absolute form of protec-
tion quickly became the accepted way of ensuring the 
growth of manufacturing employment in New Zealand 
until the 1980s. Even as late as 1979 Minister of Finance 
Muldoon restated the traditional view: 
It has been suggested that New Zealand should dis-
mantle the system of import licensing which has oper-
ated for forty years. I do not subscribe to that view. I 
have no intention of letting efficient industries go to the 
wall for the sake of a theory (Wooding 1989:94). 
It is interesting that Muldoon had referred to 'efficient' 
firms. The irony was that many of the regulations govern-
ing New Zealand industry had been introduced in the so 
called Industrial Efficiency Act of 1936. In reality New 
Zealand firms were not efficient at all compared to their 
overseas counterparts. The problem lay in the fact that 
import licensing was a very absolute form of protection 
compared with tariffs and therefore New Zealand firms 
only had to adjust to the demands of local competition, not 
the international market This meant that in the period of 
rapid post-war growth when many advanced economies 
were shedding industrial jobs in declining industries, up-
grading their manufacturing technology, and exporting on 
a large scale, New Zealand manufacturers remained 
cosseted in their protected home market without the incen-
tive to change or upgrade to the same extent Table 2, for 
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1970 1980 1990 
60.5 78.0 51.0 
50.4 48.9 25.7 
21.1 22.8 21.9 
27.8 33.4 32.9 
22.6 28.1 20.4 
12.1 10.8 7.8 
3.5 8.1 7.6 
70.8 84.1 66.0 
4.0 4.6 3.5 
(+ 75.0) 16.9% (+46.1) -25.9% (-82.6) 
272.8 318.9 236.3 
1070.9 1266.1 1223.9 
example, compares annual average growth rates of output 
and employment for New Zealand and the Netherlands for 
the 1960s. 
The general picture that emerges is that in the Netherlands, 
real value added, expanded faster than employment, pro-
ductivity increased, as traditional industries began to shed 
labour, and growth industries to absorb it New Zealand in 
the 1960s presents the picture of a much more immature 
manufacturing sector. Net output increased more slowly 
than employment despite some spectacular increases in 
industries just beginning. 
Of course this is not to imply that New Zealand manufac-
tmers were lazy or incapable of increasing their productiv-
ity. Rather that the economic environment did not encom-
age them to do so, being not only heavily protected, but 
also regulated and heavily taxed. Investigating the theme 
of regulation the New Zealand planning council came up 
with a list of nearly 400 acts of Parliament and 1 ()()() 
associated regulations, which have significant economic 
effects for New Zealand fmns. In addition it is estimated 
that there were 127 industry tribunals regulating behaviom 
and 400 official advisory committees, councils and boards. 
(Economic Monitoring Group 1985: 21) 
A good example of this is data provided to the author by the 
economist in charge of costing at T odd Motors Motor 
Assemblers in Porirua for the mid 1970s. He showed that 
in fact the manufacturer could only influence 40% of the 
total cost of cars because 60% of the final price to custom-
ers was made up of import duties, sales tax, and various 
other taxes, see table 3. 
Not only was the New Zealand manufacturing sector over 
regulated, but it was also overprotected. Elkan (1972) 
calculated that we had the most heavily protected manu-
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Table 2. Annual average growth rates of output and employment in Zealand and 
tbe Netherlands 1958-60 to 1968-70 by manufacturing group. 
Output1 Employment 
S.I.C. Group Netherlands N.Z. Netherlands N.Z. 
Food and drink 4.3 7.4 0.1 2.9 
Tobacco 3.1 -0.6 -3.2 -2.0 
Textiles 2.6 3.5 -3.6 4.5 
Clothing and Footwear 1.4 -1.9 -1.0 0.1 
Leather 1.9 2.7 -1.8 3.6 
Wood 9.4 -2.8 0.6 1.0 
Paper 8.1 1.2 2.0 6.0 
Printing 6.8 1.9 2.1 4.2 
Chemicals 14.6 8.5 3.9 10.8 
Petrol and Coal 7.2 32.8 0.7 6.2 
Rubber 5.6 0.6 1.2 3.1 
Non M. Minerals 5.3 -1.3 0.0 2.8 
Base Metals 10.1 10.3 3.0 13.1 
Metal Products 6.1 5.7 1.4 7.3 
Machinery N .E. 7.2 6.2 2.3 6.2 
MachineryE 7.1 5.6 2.8 9.6 
Transport equipment 2.6 14.8 0.1 4.6 
Other -2.8 -0.9 -3.3 0.5 
Total Manufacturing 6.8 2.3 0.8 3.5 
1. Output= value added at 1959 prices. 
Sources: Netherlands: U.N. Economic Commission for Europe Structure and Change in European 
Industry. pp 124-125. New Zealand: N.Z. Official Yearbooks and 1978-79 Manufacturing Census (unpub-
lished) Statistics Dept. 
facturing sector in the O.E.C.D., even aknowledging that 
data on effective rates of protection are notoriously diffi-
cult to calculate, especially when import licensing is 
considered. Table 4 shows that levels of effective protec-
tion increased during the 1960s then fell again up to 1979, 
but were still high in absolute tenns. 
The safe operation in a protected home market ensured that 
by and large the New Zealand manufacturing industry was 
not export-oriented. Table 5 shows that by 1980 some 
industry groups had begun to increase exports quite con-
siderably, but in some of the large employment groups 
such as metal products and machinery, the percentage of 
total output exported was very small This is highlighted 
when one compares similar figures for an export-oriented 
country like Switzerland. A recent figure from the New 
Zealand Manufactmers Federation claims that exports 
rose to about 23% of total manufacturing output in 1994. 
Now the above analysis is, like all analyses, something of 
a simplification. Various National Party governments had 
sought to reduce the coverage of import licenses, but it still 
basically covered those industries most likely to be af-
fected by foreign competition. 
From 1962 to 1978 successive governments acknowl-
edged the need for a more outward looking posture for 
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Table 3. The government and efficiency. 
Costs for a 2000cc Japanese car Oate 1970s) 
Todd Motors Pay 
Freight and Insurance 
Bank and Landing 
Duty45% 
Landed costs 
NZ Materials 
Labour/Assembly 
Overheads 
Total direct cost 
Sales tax 
Retailer 
Freight 
Total 
Source: Todd Motors 
Changes Post 1984 
$2,000 
$250 
$70 
$900 *Removed 
$3,120 
$1,200 
$350 
$500 
$5,270 
$2,200 *Removed 
$7,470 
$750 
$100 
$8,320 *Add G.S.T. 
but lower tax rate 
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Table 4. Estimates of the level of effective protection in New Zealand 
manufacturing. 
Production Group 
FOO<L beverages. tobacco 
Textiles, apparel, leather 
Wood and wood products 
Paper printing and publishing 
Chemicals, petrol, plastics 
Non M. Minerals 
Base Metals 
Metal products and machinery 
Other manufacturing 
Total Manufacturing 
88.6 
67.6 
130.8 
46.8 
21.6 
-15.1 
-5.8 
560.5 
69 
50.0 
8.0 
338.8 
187.3 
67.8 
24.3 
13.9 
161.8 
251.2 
186.4 
73.4 
8.6 
69.2 
28.9 
9.8 
48.7 
17.1 
3.7 
64.2 
76.2 
36.1 
Sources: 1and2 Elkan (1972:70, 81-82) 3 O'Dea (1980:14) 
manufacturing, but tended to see this as being fulfilled by 
attention to export promotion. In this vein various export 
taxation incentives were introduced meaning that signifi-
cant numbers of firms began to dabble in exporting if only 
to get cheap overseas trips. Willis, in a study of 100 
engineering finns carried out in 1970, found that in only 
20% did exports make up more than 20% of total sales, and 
for 65% of finns exports made up less than 10% of total 
sales. In addition over 95% of these firms were exporting 
mainly to Australia and some 50% under the provisions of 
N.A.F.T .A. (Willis 1972). This Australia/New Zealand 
Free Trade Agreement had begun in 1966 and had paved 
the way for the closer Economic Relationship which 
developed later in the 1980s. 
Also there had been far-sighted government ministers who 
had realised the importance of industrial change. Brian 
Talboys for example wrote in 1980 
Successful countries do not cling to outmoded or 
uncompetitive industries or technologies. They allow 
them to decline whether through the invisible hand of 
the market place, or the invisible boot of the planning 
agency in countries like Japan - and employ their 
resources elsewhere. The process goes by different 
Table S. Swiss Exports of Main 
Manufacturing Industries: 1970s 
Branch Exports as % % of exports 
total output 
Engineering 80 
Chemicals 90 
Clocks and watches 90 
Textiles and clothing 80 
Source: Economist smvey, 1979. 
43.2 
19.6 
8 
7.4 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
names, revitalization, upgrading, rebuilding or restruc-
turing- but the aim is basically the same (quoted in 
Willis 1982: 78). 
Towards the end of the 1970s this view began to hold sway 
and build upon some earlier landmark decisions such as 
recommendation '2I1JA from the National Development 
Conference held in May 1969. 
The manufacturing sector should be accorded a level of 
protection sufficient to promote steady industrial de-
velopment, increasing manufactured exports and 
full employment This level of protection however 
should be such as to encourage competition, efficiency 
and reasonable prices to other sectors and to consum-
ers, and should also have regard to consumer choice 
and variety. It accordingly recommended that the 
system of protection should be flexible, that import 
licensing should be replaced by tariffs as the main 
measure of protection, and that this transition should 
be carried out in accordance with a clearly defined 
programme and within a reasonable time (quoted in 
Wooding 1989: 92). 
Therefore ten years after the National Development Con-
ference (N.D.C.) had passed this recommendation the 
National government embarked on what W ooding calls 'A 
Cautious Liberalisation' (W ooding 1989: 94) This liber-
alisation included a wider free trade agreement with Aus-
tralia, import license tendering, the industries study pro-
gramme, and the recognition by government of the need to 
reduce the uneveMess of levels of manufacturing protec-
tion. 
The Industries Studies Programme in particular was inter-
esting because of the political furore it caused; in retro-
spect it was rather tame compared to what Roger Douglas 
was to introduce later. Back in 1978 the Tariff Review 
Committee had identified eleven industry groups for fur-
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Table 6. Major economic liberalisation measures in New Zealand 1984-199C). 
Deregulation of entry licensing in industry 
Partial deregulation of occupational licensing 
removal of other operating barriers in industry 
Removal of price control 
Removal of import licensing 
Significant decrease in import tariffs 
Revision of town and country planning 
Revision in role of producer marketing boards 
Abolition of many quangos and quasi-government organisations 
Removal of financial controls (interest rate ceiling, 
1984+ 
1985+ 
1984+ 
1984-88 
1984-88 
1985-92 
1987 
1987+ 
1987 
reserve ratio requirements, priorities for various sectors) 
Removal of foreign exchange controls 
1984-86 
1984 
1985 
1985 
1986-88 
1986+ 
1987+ 
1988+ 
1986 
Liberalization of foreign direct investment 
Floating of the exchange rate 
Revision of corporate, personnel, and direct taxation 
Corporatization of stage trading activities 
Programme of sale of state assets 
Review of education and health provision 
Removal of monopoly rights on state trading 
Review of competition regulation: Commerce Act/Bank Act/ 
Securities Act/Companies Act 
Deregulation of transport sector 
Deregulation of financial services sector 
Partial deregulation of energy sector 
Removal of concessions for favoured investment (e.g. R&D) 
1986-89 
1983-88 
1986 
1986+ 
1984+ 
1984+ 
1983+ 
1987+ 
1989+ 
1989 
1989 
1989 
1990 
1990 
Removal of concessions for favoured sectors (agriculture, export sectors) 
Establishment of closer economic relations with Australia 
Reorganisation of core government departments 
Reform of local government 
Deregulation of ports and waterfront work 
Removal of shop trading hours restrictions 
Corporatisation of some local authority trading activities 
Partial deregulation of shipping 
Resource management law reform 
Source: Savage and Bollard,(1990) 
ther study because of their need for continuing high assist-
ance. Some of these studies were to be carried out by 
government departments and others by the I.D.C. (Indus-
tries Development Commission), called the Industrial 
Destruction Commission by the Unions. In effect the 
Industries Studies Programme was the last attempt at 
'planned restructuring· before the market realities ofRoger 
Douglas after 1984. In fact the impact of the Industries 
Studies Programme was largely obliterated by the wider 
changes needed under the C.E.R. arrangement with Aus-
tralia (signed 1982), just as the programme of trade 
liberalisation under C .E.R. was taken over by more gen-
eral liberalisation policies post 1984. 
In summary the point being made here is that some 
deregulation/liberalisation had begun prior to 1984 through 
the Industries Studies Programme, the review of licensing, 
the C.E.R. agreement and other indirect initiatives such as 
the deregulation of the freight transport industry. But 
change was still slow and much of this so called liberalisa-
tion took place at the same time as Muldoon' s National 
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government imposed a wages and price freeze to try and 
curb inflation. The real changes were still to come. 
What happened after 1984? 
Savage and Bollard detail three types of liberalisation 
affecting the New Zealand economy post 1984 (Savage 
and Bollard 1990: 37-38). 
Firstly there was macro-economic liberalisation. This is 
basically those policies not designed to be industry spe-
cific but have impacted on firms by altering the prices of 
inputs or outputs, or by directly influencing the economic 
environment in which firms operate. 
Secondly there were the reductions in protection and 
subsidies including the phase out of import licensing, 
moves toward lower tariffs, and withdrawal of various 
production subsidies both implicit and explicit 
The third major type of change is deregulation. This has 
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Table 7. Cbange in manufacturing employment in New Zealand 1987-93. 
Industry 1987 1993 Actual Change %Change 
Meat processing 36640 27861 -9779 -24.0 
Dairy products 8035 7616 -419 -5.2 
Other foods 24075 23237 -838 -3.4 
Beverages and tobacco 4611 2671 -1940 -42.1 
Food, Bev. and Tobacco 73361 61385 -11976 -16.3 
Textiles 13988 10552 -3436 -24.6 
Apparel and footwear 26862 16818 -10044 -37.4 
Textiles, Clothing 
and Footwear 40850 27370 -13480 -33.0 
Wood Processing 
and Prod. 26560 21729 -4831 -18.2 
Paper and paper products 10637 9033 -1604 -15.1 
Printing and publishing 19278 16895 -2383 -12.4 
Paper, Printing 
and Publishing 29915 25928 -3987 -13.3 
Industrial chemicals 5079 4614 -465 -9.2 
Other chemicals 7486 5904 -1582 -21.3 
Petroleum refining 1082 759 -323 -29.9 
Petrol and coal products 570 195 -375 -65.8 
Rubber products 3727 1923 -1804 -48.4 
Plastic products 77@ 7025 -744 -9.6 
Chemicals etc. 25713 20420 -5293 -20.6 
Non M. Metals 9708 6355 -3353 -34.5 
Basic Metal Products 6599 6104 -495 -7.5 
Fabricated metal prod. 27446 19459 -7987 -29.1 
Machinery 19032 15448 -3584 -18.8 
Electrical machinery 13445 10226 -3219 -23.9 
Transport Equipment 21382 7816 -13566 -63.4 
Professional Equipment 1313 1008 -305 -23.2 
Fabricated Metals 
and Mach. 82618 53957 -28661 -34.7 
Other Manufacturing 4739 4107 
Total Manufacturing 300063 227354 -72709 -24.3 
Source: New Zealand Business Activity Statistics 1987-93. 
taken various fonns including the removal of price con-
trols, the liberalisation of competition laws and the 
corporatisation/privatisation of government trading enter-
prises. Table six below is Savage and Bollard's summary 
of the major economic liberalisation measures 1984-1990. 
Tbe results of cbange. 
There is little doubt about the magnitude of the changes. 
Table 1 has already shown a net loss of 82,000 manufac-
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turing jobs in the 1980s - nearly 26% of the manufacturing 
work force. Declines were particularly severe in textiles 
and clothing ( -48% ), and food, beverages and tobacco (-
35%) while the losses were least severe in wood products 
(-4%), paper and printing (-2%), and base metals (-6%). 
The publication of the New Zealand Business Activity 
Statistics for the first time in 1987 provided another useful 
data base from which to assess the changes in employment 
and output Table 7 shows changes in employment 1987-
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Table 9. Regional change in New baland 
••wnufaduring 1987-1993. Regions ranked 
from 1JtM to WOI st by pestmtage change in 
employnamt. 
Region Absolute Percentage 
Change Change 
Mad borough 
Tasman/Nelson 
Waikato 
Taranaki 
HawkesBay 
Cantezbury 
Southland 
Bay of Plenty* 
National average 
Manawatu* 
West Coast 
Auckland 
Otago 
Northland 
Gisbome 
Wellington* 
3 
-5 
-1068 
-1495 
-2399 
-7997 
-2145 
-3177 
-71148 
-4087 
-555 
-28628 
-4093 
-1912 
-981 
-10312 
Source: Business Activity Statistics 1987-1992. 
0.1 
-0.1 
-5.4 
-16.6 
-19.1 
-19.2 
-20.0 
-22.5 
-23.7 
-24.5 
-25.9 
-26.5 
-28.0 
-28.2 
-31.1 
-33.1 
* Estimates derived from former local govemment regions. 
we saw that the transport equipment manufacturing indus-
try had the highest rate of decline of any three digit 
industrial group. In retrospect this is hardly surprising 
given the level of protection and intervention in this 
industry: As Douglas Greer said: 
An auto-assembly industry in New Zealand is essen-
tially artificial. That is to say, its existence is dependent 
on the assistance regime established and maintained by 
Table 10. Automobile Assembly Industry 
Profile 
msn' 1981'84 1992 
Establishments 19 23 28 26 
Sales ($M at~ 1003.5 1192.2 1())4.61 NA 
JR:es) 
Ouqlrt <cus. cm? 64 631 53.1 52 
ErnJ*>yment 7813 5Tl4 3790 2291 
Average est. size3 4 411 251 135 88 l.aOOurProdoctivity 81 10.9 14 '11.7 
1 March 1986/87. 2 1983/84 figure is calender 1983, 
!988189 figure is year to the .fnd of August 1988. 
In terms of employment. Cars per full time 
equivalent employee. 
Sources: Department of statistics. 
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government (Greer 1990: 107). 
He went on to say; 
the cost of landing a fully assembled new car on the 
dock of Auckland is barely more than the cost of a 
knocked down kit in need of assembly by New Zealand 
labour. Thus it is somewhat inconsistent to say (as was 
said in the 1984 industrial plan) that despite greatly 
reduced protection it is the governments intention to 
retain the assembly sector but to have it efficient. It 
simply cannot be efficient by world standards; without 
substantial protection it would simply not exist (Greer 
1990: 107). 
In fact rationalisation in the motor assembly industry has 
been going on for some time even before 1984. As table 
10 shows. The numbers of establishments actuaJJy in-
creased through the 1980s but employment fell away 
dramatically. and labour productivity in tenns of numbers 
of cars per employee also increased dramatically. 
The initial round of changes were ushered in with the 1984 
Motor Vehicle Industry Plan which removed import li-
censes for the CKD (Completely Knocked Down) 
unassembled vehicles, expanded the market for CBU 
(Completely Built Up) vehicles, reduced tariffs, abolished 
some sales taxes and removed hire purchase controls. 
In 1987 as part of the Closer Economic Relation negotia-
tion with Australia. and as part of general deregulation 
policy, the plan was revised and the deregulation and 
abolition of protection processes sped up. 
Table 11 shows the eight plants that have closed since 1984 
and table 12 gives the remaining automotive assembly 
plants as of 1994. 
The closures also took place alongside. and in some cases 
associated with a change in ownership structures. This 
Table 11. Auto Assembly Plants that have 
Closed Since Implementation of the 
1984 Plan 
Company Plant Location 
DaihatsuNZ Te Awamutu 
Ford Motor Co. of NZ Lower Hutt 
Mauta Motors of NZ Otahuhu 
Motor Holdings Ltd. Otahuhu 
Waitara 
NZ Motor Corp. (Honda) Auckland 
Nissan Otahuhu 
Suzuki Wanganui 
General Motors Upper Hutt (Car Plant) 
Source: Greer 1990: pllO 
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Table 12. Remaining Automobile Assembly 
Plants in New Zealand 1989 
Company 
General Motors 
Honda 
Mitsubishi 
Nissan 
Toyota 
V ANZ (Mazda/Ford) 
Plant Location 
Upper Hutt (Truck Assembly) 
Nelson 
Porirua 
Wiri 
Thames (Passenger) 
Christchurch (Commercial) 
Sylvia Park (Commercial) 
Manakau City (Passenger) 
Source: Greer 1990: plll. 
was mainly that Japanese suppliers who had previously 
left local assembly to New Zealand agents now bought into 
the assembly business themselves, including Honda, 
MitsubisbL and Nissan. Their buy-outs ushered in new 
manufactwing standards and work -place methodologies 
such as the celebrated 'Nissan Way' of manufacture. 
There is little doubt that as a result of deregulation, 
lowering of protection, vertical integration, new labom 
relations and ownership changes, the New Zealand motor 
assembly industry has become much more efficient. that is 
in the narrowest sense of producing its output with the 
lowest cost of inputs. However the industry can never 
become efficient in the broader sense of international 
competition because of its small scale. It is common 
knowledge for example that some plants in Japan produce 
enough cars to satisfy the whole New Zealand market for 
all vehicles. The nation must therefore make ultimate 
decisions on whether it will keep the tariffs in order to 
protect the remaining assembly plants and the 2,300 jobs 
in New Zealand. 
This raises an interesting point that despite the massive 
shedding of jobs New Zealand manufacturing still has 
quite high levels of protection. If we compare ourselves 
with Australia for example, using some selected measures 
of protection, what becomes clear from table thirteen is 
that despite greater publicity given to the restructuring 
process in New Zealand our overall level of industrial 
protection is still higher than Australia 
The removal of protection began much earlier in Au~ 
the process of structural adjustment was more gradual and 
finns had a longer time to adjust to new policy environ-
ments. Also import licensing was abolished 20 years 
earlier in Australia This has contributed to a kind of 
'stored up' effect of postponing change in New Zealand. 
This thesis is reinforced by looking at longer tenn com-
parisons between Australia and New Zealand. Table 
fourteen illustrates the fact that the cumulative loss of 
employment has been greater in Australia where as tbe 
largest single intercensalloss has been in New Zealand in 
the last five years. 
What is happening today 
From the above analysis it would be possible to conclude 
that all was doom and gloom in New Zealand manufactur-
ing. In many ways this couldn' t be further from the truth. 
The sector has definitely turned the corner and most 
indicators look good for the next year or so. Basically it 
appears that those businessmen that have survived restruc-
turing, or set up since, are now much more lean and mean 
and ready to face the new competitive environment of the 
1990s. 
Table fifteen shows the trends in key ratios for New 
Zealand manufacturing since the September quarter 1990. 
and the turnaround is evident. While the level of export 
growth has levelled off this is compensated for by growth 
in domestic sales as the New Zealand economy begins to 
grow again. Both hours worked and employment began to 
grow for the first time since the mid 1980s with the sector 
creating 23,300 equivalent fulltime jobs in 1993. Most 
dramatic and encouraging of all was the increase in invest-
ment. particularly in new plants and machinery. 
Table 13. Comparison of selected measures of protection 
Measure Australia New Zealand 
Items free of tariffs (1987) % 37 49 
Items below 15% (1987)% 84.4 67 
Average level of industry tariffs dutiable 252 27.5 
(mid-1980s) Total 12.6 16.3 
Effective rates of assistance for manufacturing 25% 39% 
1981/82 
1989/90 16% 19% 
Metal products 31% 69% 
1981/82 
1989/90 18% 34% 
Source: Duncan Lattimore and Bollard (1992) 
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Table 14.Longer term employment 
change in Australia and New Zealand 
manufacturing 1971-1991. 
FuJI.dme equivalents 
(lnOOO) 
1971 
%change 1971-76 
1976 
%change 197&81 
1981 
%change 1981-86 
1986 
%change 1986-91 
1991 
%change 1971-91 
Australia 
1304 
.S3% 
1195 
-13% 
1180 
-13.1% 
1052 
.S.4% 
963 
-26.2% 
Newbalarvl 
282 
9.6% 
309 
~.6% 
306 
-2% 
300 
-20.6% 
238 
-15.6% 
Sowces: Australia- A.B.S. Yearbook 1991; New Zealand 
- Philpott 1990. 
The above data along with the general euphoria about the 
strength of the economy and economic growth in New 
Zealand would lead one to believe that the economy is 
finally getting out of what Franklin calls the 'commodity 
trap• -an export-led economy with an over dependence on 
commodity exports for which the elasticities of demand 
tend to be low or fluctuating. This leads to large fluctua-
tions in export earnings which is obviously detrimental to 
both individual producers and the country as a whole. 
Some data on this front are encouraging for example the 
latest Manufacturers Federation Smvey stresses the growth 
of what they call 'Elaborately Transformed Manufactur-
ers•. 
The composition of manufacturing exports is moving 
increasingly towards elaborately transformed manu-
facturers (ETMs). This group of products which incor-
porate a high level of domestic design and value added 
has been growing at a substantially faster rate than 
other manufactured exports for some 18 months. The 
major force behind the export expansion of ETMs is 
coming from the engineering sector. (New Zealand 
Manufacturers Federation 1994: 3) 
However when total exports are examined in more detail 
the trends are not so good. Table sixteen shows the 
breakdown of New Zealand merchandise exports 1990-
1993. What is clear is that exports increased by over $3.8 
billion in that period but that over 7 5% of this increase was 
contributed by commodity groups- meat, fish, dairy prod-
ucts, forest products, wool, iron and steel, and aluminium. 
Now admittedly more of these sectors output are further 
processed than previously- dairy products for example are 
now much more value added. But some huge increases 
came from outright commodities like sawn timber and logs 
-over $700 million added 1990-1993. It is clear that the 
price has already begun to fall and these huge increases 
will not be sustained. 
Further disturbing evidence is provided by Kreigsmann in 
a 1994 briefing paper to the New Zealand Manufacturers 
Federation. He stresses the importance of increasing the 
value added content of New Zealand's production but 
shows that while value added content has gone up in 
nominal terms, in real terms it has shrunk considerably 
during the last decade (Kreigsmann: 1994: 11); see figure 
one. 
Conclusion 
The New Zealand manufacturing sector suffered a mas-
sive shakeout of employment during the late 1980s. In the 
last three years some of that employment has begun to 
return wiht manufacturing leading the way in lowering 
unemployment in New Zealand. There is some case-study 
evidence which shows that these new jobs are different 
from the low-ski11ed process workers characteristic of the 
old heavily protected pre-1984 manufacturing regime. 
However the trade statistics are rather contradictory in 
being able to show whether New Zealand has indeed 
undergone some kind of structural transformation to de-
velop a more mature manufacturing sector not so depend-
ent on processing commodities and exporting goods more 
dependent on price rather than high value, research and 
development 
Future research 
More research is needed at the finn level to examine 
precisely what sort of manufacturing jobs are being cre-
ated in New Zealand, where the shortages are and what 
Table IS. Trends in key ratios for NZ Manufacturing. (% change real Value) 
Year ended Sep-90 Sep-91 Sep-92 Sep-93 Jun-94 
Exports 3 8.9 11.9 5.3 12.8 
Domestic Sales -1.6 -11 2 8.6 5.0 
Total sales -0.7 -7.3 4.3 7.8 6.7 
Hours worked -1.5 -7.1 -0.9 5.6 8.0 
Full time employment N.Av. -5.6 -4.6 3.4 5.6 
Investment -5.1 -24.6 -13.3 34.8 25.2 
Source: NZ Manufacturers Federation (1994). 
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Table 16. Contribution to New Zealand exports 1990-93. (Million $NZ: June 
years) 
Group 1990 1993 Change 
Actual 
Live Animals 193.7 172.1 -21.6 -11.1 
Beef and veal 1091.6 1418.7 327.1 30 
Lamb and mutton 1093.5 1389 295.5 27 
Total meat 2319 3057.5 748.5 32.3 
Fish 503.7 807.8 304.1 60.4 
Squid etc. 108.4 140.6 32.2 29.7 
Crustaceans 89.4 114.6 25.2 28.2 
Milk Cream Yoghurt 998.4 1352.9 354.5 35.5 
Butter 710.5 796.5 86 12.1 
Cheese 341 497.9 156.9 46 
Total Dairy 2066.9 26(;6.2 599.3 29 
Sausage casings 105.5 122.9 17.4 16.5 
Timber and logs 402.4 1145.9 743.5 704.7 
Wood products 207.5 336.3 128.8 62.1 
Pulp 387.2 352.8 -34.4 -8.9 
Paper and products 352.1 429.2 77.1 21.9 
Total Forest 13(;1.2 2271.6 916.4 67.3 
Books and papers 32.5 32.3 
-0.2 -0.6 
Wool 1315.9 900.8 
-415.1 -31 .5 
Carpets etc. 88.3 71.6 
-16.7 -18.9 
Textiles and Apparel 86.4 211.4 125 144.6 
Stones and Jewellery 95.1 267 171.9 180.6 
Iron and steel 328.7 433.4 104.7 31.9 
Alu. and products 742 659.8 -82.2 
-11.1 
Machinery and appliances 377 496.6 119.6 31.7 
Electrical Products 227.2 334.8 107.6 47.3 
Re. Exports 638.9 730.3 91.4 14.3 
Total Merchandise 15163.5 19006.2 3842.1 25.3 
75.9% (Commodities) of increase= Meat/flsh/wooVdairy/forest/alu. 
9.1% (Manufactmes) = Textiles/appareVmachinery. 
implication this has for the education and training system. 
We need to know for example whether the 20,000 or so 
new manufactwing jobs created in the last two years are 
merely the result of temporary staff being taken on at 
minimum pay rates under the climate created by the 
Employment Contracts Act; or are there genuine new 
long-term positions arising demanding new skills, an 
updated apprenticeship system and genuine career paths 
for schoolleavers? 
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